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French law seems quite unique in how it  uses the notion of humanity.  It probably 
stems from the way we conceive of the collective group and the role of international law, 
since, in the French mind, an individual will belong to humanity and owe duties towards it. 
That is why French law aims at protecting humanity as well as mankind. 
In French, there is no distinction between humanity and mankind (humankind). Hence 
any legal notion of humanity must therefore distinguish humanity as a collective group from 
humanity as a value, belonging to the first one conferring the latter one. Indeed, human beings 
are, in law, protected by their humanity, but they must also comply with the duties flowing 
from their humanity. 
Humanity as a value may also reflect on the behavior to adopt when considering those 
who  are  not  human.  We,  as  humans,  have  to  treat  these  non-humans  with  humanity 
(humaneness),  as  the  debate  on  “the  great  apes’  human  rights”  shows.  Indeed,  as  Alain 
Finkielkraut  beautifully  explains,  humanity is  referred  to  sometimes  as  a  separation  from 
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animals or, in other times, from barbarians, sometimes as the mercy we show to them, “a 
royalty and its challenge.”1
The ambiguity of the notion of humanity can easily be gauged, as soon as you realize 
that it refers either to the collective group (humankind) , or the quality of each of its members 
(humanness),   or  the  human  species  (human  race)   or  even the  morality  of   certain  acts 
(humaneness).  “The conscience  of  mankind”  mentioned in  the preamble  of  the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights alludes both to the collective group formed by all human beings 
and to their universal  values and in a third meaning to the quality of  being human, as a 
member of the human species. This third dimension seems to be established as a biological 
truth in the law. The expression “members of the human family” is used in the preamble of 
the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human Rights.  According to  Mireille  DELMAS MARTY “ 
beyond the “human rights” the question which must be considered is the legal construct of the 
idea of humanity. The notions that can be appealed to, such as “crime against humanity” or 
even “human” have long been confined to the person, while biotechnologies today concern 
humanity as a whole. Genetic engineering, for example, may jeopardize the integrity of the 
human species, not only physically, but also, as it were, metaphysically. 
The legal concept of humanity is based on common features and a common sense of 
belonging fostering identity and equality and is fairly recent in the history of humanity.  2Its 
strongest expression in law can be found in international institutions in the second half of the 
20th century.Various  international  offences  protect  humanity,  defined  either  as  the 
characteristic quality of people (crime against humanity) or as a collective group (genocide). 
Humanity, as we have conceived of it in the second half of the 20th century, is dignity, 
the duty (burden) carried  by each individual  as the result  of  his  inherent  worthiness as a 
human being. Humanity is both a community of belonging as well as of values.  This double 
meaning is reflected in judicial rulings and the State, through the voice of the judges, denies 
seeing it as a power relationship and sometimes aims at ensuring ethical requirements more or 
less  translated  into traditional  notions  of  law,  such as the notions  of  “person” or “public 
order”.  The  famous  French  dwarf-tossing  case  symbolizes  the  State’s  attitude  towards 
limiting  individual  freedom  physically,  on  the  ground  of  what  can  be  called  “human 
(physical)  subjugation”.3 Individual  are legally compelled to become accountable  for their 
being human. It is their duty as individuals.
1 Alain FINKIELKRAUT, L’humanité perdue. Essai sur le XX°siècle, Editions du Seuil, Collection Points-Essai, 
1996.
2 « The concept of humanity, including, without distinction of race or culture, all forms of the human species, 
onset is very late and limited expansion», Claude Lévi-Strauss,  Anthropologie structurale II, Plon, 1973, p. 383
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In the dwarf-tossing case, the judge accepted as legal the decision taken by a mayor to 
forbid a dwarf being thrown for fun by other people in a night club. Most commentators 
clearly highlighted that this decision  imposed a limitation on individual liberties but also laid 
the emphasis  on the “wrong” done to humanity.  Of course, the aspect that  has been most 
commented upon in this case is the intrinsic worthiness of dignity for its owner,  in other 
words, the protection against  oneself.  However, this aspect reveals  that  the mechanism of 
human dignity can be distinguished from the dignity of the person. The former is objective, 
shared by all,  intrinsic and has to be combined with the latter  that is related to individual 
personality and freedom of choice. The theme of this duty a priori linked to the renewal of 
ethics may be accounted for by the success of moral philosophies stemming from Judaism, 
mainly in its phenomenological branch. A genealogical research indeed brings us to retain the 
Judaic tradition as an important source.
So we are able to explain that the use of the notion of humanity is double. On one hand, the 
notion establishes a group protected by Law which is a link for all individuals,  and one way 
to  define  human  being  and  consequently  human  person.  On  the  other  hand,  humanity 
legitimate an other judicial notion, the dignity; that is used to protect or limit freedom.
1. Humanity as a group of humans,  humankind as a legal value.  
First,  the notion of humanity back to  the question of the genome.  Then we will  see that 
French law has  invented  a  new biotechnology-related  offence  :  the  crime  against  human 
species.
1.1 The genome legal status, a notion both individual and collective. 
Humanity as a group can be dealt with diachronically, whereas humankind has to be 
analyzed synchronically, taking into account the very existence of the subject, be it human or 
not. As they seek a realistic basis to these terms, the legislators and the drafters will therefore 
tend to shift  the meaning of the adjective human from describing biological  belonging to 
qualifying the entire human species. However, they very often opt for a symbolic conception 
3 « I have no right to be happy in every way,  and I'm not allowed  to enjoy the ways that debase myself (...). 
debase myself any practice that makes me a thing. But ultimately it is the problem of freedom, since I treated 
myself as no longer a free subject (…) » wrote Max Marcuzzi, in Emmanuel Dockès  et Gilles Lhuilier (Dir), Le 
corps et ses représentations, vol. 1, LITEC, Coll. CREDIMI Théories et droit, 2001, p. 73. (we translate)
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of  belonging,  since  they cannot  assert  with  certitude  what  human identity  is  or  what  the 
relationships  of  individuals  with  the  group  are.  That  is  why  the  human  genome  is 
symbolically seen as a heritage of humanity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
It is illustrated in the way genetic data are dealt with in the law: they are both unique and 
common to all.  The works of the International  Bioethics  Committee showed how genetic 
reductionism (reducing the person to their genome) remained and should remain outside the 
law, outside the “ought to be.” The symbolical meaning of “the heritage of humanity” intends 
to prevent humans from being defined only by theirs genome. Against the racist doctrines 
which attempted to establish discrimination on biological grounds, contemporary law shares 
common roots with genetics and relies on it to prove the uniqueness of each individual. As 
established by the drafters of the Universal Declaration of UNESCO on the human genome 
and human rights in article 2 (b) "that dignity makes it imperative not reduce individuals to 
their genetic characteristics and to respect their uniqueness and diversity.”
The position of the French Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council)  must be 
understood in that sense when, in 1994, it linked the protection of the integrity of the human 
species to the dignity of the human person. The 1994 laws set the protection of the integrity of 
the human species as a legislative principle. This principle establishes some unknown duties 
to everybody, mainly for example the duty not to do changes to the transmissible heritage to 
future generations. The Constitutional Council stated the constitutional void of the issue and 
let parliamentarians decide on the limits to put on the alteration of the genome. The European 
Convention  on  bioethics  established  some  sort  of  right  to  inherit  unmodified  genetic 
characteristics (resolution No. 934, 1982 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe relating to genetic engineering).
1.2 Crime against the human species.
By creating the offence of "crime against the human species" , the French legislature 
awkwardly recognized a legal reality to an entity (“species”) which does not exist from a 
biological perspective. Between 1994 and 2004, the French criminal code included a section 
relating to the protection of the human species, punishing by twenty years’ imprisonment for 
the organization and selection of persons. Since 2004, reproductive cloning has been added to 
the list of offences. The preamble of the Convention of the Council of Europe on biomedicine 
also mentions "the need to respect the human being both as an individual and as a member of 
the human species.” However, one problem arises when the concepts of species and humanity 
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are both called upon. Indeed, the “human species” is an idea that falls under the protection of 
the  law,  although  it  is  difficult  to  know  very  well  what  is  prohibited  beyond  the  now 
established offences of reproductive cloning and eugenic practices. 
An individual can be genetically identified as human by analogy, but it does not imply 
the uniqueness of the human species. The idea of humanity cannot be limited to genetic data. 
The  diversity  of  genetic  origins  and  mutations  characterizing  the  different  populations 
challenges the establishment of something like an integrity of "species". Law cannot freeze 
humanity in its genome. The human species becomes the legal version of humanity that, since 
Aristotle, has been found in the individual face or, in the case of the "Monster", in the simple 
fact to be born of a woman, but never in the genome. Crimes against the human species would 
be, in this sense, the last avatars of a still dominant genetic determinism, of a naturalization of 
culture.
Article 16-4 of the French civil code provides that “nobody may invade the integrity of 
mankind. Any eugenic practice which aims at organizing the selection of persons is forbidden. 
Without prejudice to researches aiming at preventing and treating genetic diseases, there may 
be no alteration of the genetic characters with a view to changing the descent of a person.” 
The  ban  on  reproductive  human  cloning  spreads  across  all  legal  orders.   Banning 
cloning equals to incriminating a technique (or a set of techniques) in itself or the harmfulness 
of all its applications. This is probably mainly because this technique is, in an unprecedented 
way,  straying  away from the  natural  and  hitherto  preserved  model  of  human  generation. 
Following the additional protocol to the Oviedo Convention, article 16-4 of the Civil Code 
still provides that "any action having the purpose of causing the birth of a child genetically 
identical to another person alive or dead is forbidden” and is  relayed by the Code of Public 
Health (art. 2151-2). This prohibition relies on the dignity of the human person insofar as it 
mainly seeks to prohibit reproductive cloning that would undermine the dignity of the clone. 
Section  214-2 punishes  by thirty  years’  imprisonment  and a  fine of €7,500,000 euro any 
infringement  on  this  prohibition.  The  criminalization  of  cloning  is  characterized  by  the 
anticipation of the commission of the first offence. A 30-year limitation period runs from the 
majority of the eventual clone. A €45,000 fine and three years’ imprisonment sanction the 
person whose gift, promise, threat, agenda, abuse of authority or power, convinced others to 
lend themselves to a collection of cells or gametes, in order to bring about the birth of a child 
genetically identical to another person alive or dead, or made any propaganda or advertising 
for eugenics or reproductive cloning.
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However, therapeutic cloning seems less shocking. It only applies to embryos which 
are the subject of totipotent cell samples. According to article L.2151-4 of the Public health 
code, It is prohibited to create an embryo by means of cloning with therapeutic purposes. The 
criminalization  of  therapeutic  cloning  is  not  as severely penalised as  that  of reproductive 
cloning: criminal sanctions do not target the purpose of the operation but the general principle 
of  the  use  of  embryos.  Carrying  out  in  vitro fertilisation  or  cloning  human  embryos  for 
commercial or industrial purposes, therapeutic purposes or research purposes is punished with 
with seven years’ imprisonment and a €100, 000 fine (articles 2163-3 and s).
Referring more and more to the notion of “species” seems to pose problems, not only 
in  terms  of  the  criminalizing  of  reproductive  cloning,  but  in  the  very  principle  of  the 
legalizing of the concept of species itself.4 Indeed, the concept of species is yet difficult to 
define outside the law, which is the first hurdle for the lawyer.  Its biological definition is 
traditionally a scientific battlefield where scientists, more precisely “essentialists” (there is a 
limited number of recombined universals known as species) compete against “nominalists” 
(the species is a conventional association of zoological objects ("taxa")).
Thus,  the concept  of species  does  not  seem well-adapted to  the legal  field.  It  can 
legitimately be understood as a rhetorical instrument that uses data relating to the body to 
serve a  political  end linked to  the  scientistic  and progressive ideology which has  framed 
genetics  since  its  inception.5 This  scientism  is  what  "new  naturalism"  is  implicitly  and 
paradoxically based on; humans are objectively defined by criteria that distinguish them from 
other species.
However, the eminent dignity of mankind has no link with the concept of species, 
even though the integrity of the latter may indirectly protect the dignity of the person, by 
establishing the intangibility of the genome. In fact, the reference to “human species” under 
the guise of an objective and scientific reference really institutionalizes it associates a false 
criterion to it:  chance in sexual reproduction.  However,  if  one focuses on the two crimes 
against the species, the incriminations condemn artificial changes to human reproduction, in 
both  cases,  be  it  a  collective  eugenic  policy  on  the  one  hand,  or  the  end  of  genetic 
uncertainties on the other hand.
4 Philippe  DESCAMPS,  Un  crime  contre  l’espèce  humaine ?  Enfants  clonés,  enfants  damnés,  Ed.  Les 
empêcheurs de tourner en rond, 2004.
5 Jacques  TESTART,  Le  désir  du  gène,  François  Bourrin-Juillard,  1992 ;  Bernard  DEBRE,  La  Grande 
Transgression, Michel Lafon, 2001 ; Franck MAGNARD et Nicolas TENZER, Le spermatozoïde hors la loi : de  
la  bioéthique  à  la  biopolitique,  Calmann-Lévy,  1991 ;  James WATSON,  Gènes,  génomes  et  société,  Odile 
Jacob, Sciences, 2000, p. 284 (the author recommends governments keep away from genetic issues).
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Normality and abnormality are social constructs which can more and more often leave 
aside the naturalistic artefact and nevertheless remain efficient. 
Mark Hunyadi opens an essential critical perspective: individual autonomy has always 
been built on the confrontation between the "natural" as a model for humanity and the “human 
nature” as the ability to move beyond the natural model;6 but today biotechnologies enable to 
change man and not to talk about nature anymore: "it is not the human nature which dictates 
what we should be, it is what we are that tells what human nature is." Human nature becomes 
an object to be shaped.
Proponents of criminalizing cloning initially campaigned for its assimilation to a crime 
against humanity. In that sense, humanity does not refer to human species as natural sciences 
understand it, but rather to the "human family" as intended in the preamble of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. It is necessary to distinguish explicitly culture from nature, the 
human  rights  man  and  the  biotechnological  man.  Mireille  Delmas-Marty  thus  wrote 
"protecting humanity as such, I think, is first accepting the separation between the human 
rights man and the biological man." However, crimes against the species are made to follow 
exactly the opposite logic; namely, it is the biological man that is put forward to protect the 
human  rights  man.  Hence,  we  prefer  the  wording  used  in  article  1  of  the  Universal 
Declaration  on  the  Human  Genome  and  Human  Rights  adopted  by  the  UNESCO on 11 
November  1997 which  states  "the  human  genome  underlies  the  fundamental  unity  of  all 
members  of  the  human  family,  as  well  as  the  recognition  of  their  inherent  dignity  and 
diversity."
2. Humanity as dignity.
In  that  sense,  humanity  is  protected,  not  as  a  group but  as  the  quality  that  lies  in  each 
individual.  The  concept  of  humanity  used  here  is  understood  symbolically.  Humanity  is 
defined by a political  convention and not by a biological  repository.  Yet,  many problems 
remain. Human dignity is used in law to prohibit certain behaviours that tend to treat people 
as  objects.  This  assessment  relies  on  philosophical  conceptions.  The  judges  then  have 
difficulties to hide that they relied on moral principles to make their decisions.
2.1 Humanity and the individual subject of law
6 Mark HUNYADI, Je est un clone, l’éthique à l’épreuve des biotechnologies, Seuil, La couleur des idées, 2004, 
p. 26.
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The term "human being" now plays a growing role in international declarations (what the 
Universal Declaration of human rights in its preamble  calls “the advent of a world in which 
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want"). 
Even if human beings are essentially defined by their corporeality, by their mere biological 
existence  deprived  of  any  social  dimension,  nonetheless,  the  legal  qualification  of  facts 
applies to them. “Human being” is a legal concept such as that of "person". It allows the 
concept of humanity regarding the subject of law to enter into law.
It  appears that  the “natural  person” is  first  and foremost  a  human being,  a person 
belonging  to  humanity.  Thus,  the  legal  term  “human  being”  encompasses  the  legal 
representations  of being a human and being an individual,  and it  allows in turn to better 
identify a part of the concept of  “human person” as coextensive with the notion of human 
being,  whereas  the  moral  person  is  a  juristic  person.   This  correlation  is  less  based  on 
biological data than on the genealogical principle or  the achievements of civilization thanks 
to the law. In that sense, humanity takes on a dimension that can be named “humanhood”. 
(human condition) but which remains linked to the biological existence of a human person. 
Every human person is a human being; yet not every human being is a person, as exemplified 
in the status granted to the embryo, who is referred to as a human being in the Civil Code, but 
who only becomes a human person once given legal personality. The notion of person thus 
gives an extra dimension to that of human being: it is understood as the actor, the subject, the 
will encompassed in the notion of legal personality. The latter disappears with the death of the 
human being who ceases to live and to be subject of law, however, he remains the object of 
the law, protected as a human subject, protected as a human by the law.
The concept of human being leads us to understand the subject of the law, that is often 
the object of the law, bearing in mind the notion of humanity; it relies on the biological data 
which  equate  the  belonging  to  humanity  with  the  possession  of  a  human  genome.  The 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being dated 16 
November 1996 clearly illustrates  this  configuration in its  preamble,  paragraph 10,  which 
states that the signatories are: " Convinced of the need to respect the human being both as an 
individual and as a member of the human species and recognizing the importance of ensuring 
the dignity of the human being”
2.1.1 The humanity of the in vitro embryo
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The in vitro embryo is protected under French law, on account of humanity. Bioethics laws 
(currently articles L. 152-l and seq. of Public health code) provide some elements to protect 
the in vitro embryo that contribute to the notion of "respect". First, the embryo may only be 
conceived in vitro for medically assisted reproduction purposes and not for research purposes. 
But  researchers  may  use  embryos  given  by  parents.  However,  they  cannot  be  used  for 
commercial and industrial purposes. The procreating couple’s consent is required (6 August 
2004  Act,  art.25  =  Loi  du  6  août  2004),  under  the  control  of  the  Biomedicine  Agency. 
However, the destruction of embryos (in case there be no parental project,  or donation be 
impossible, or conservation extend for more than five years) attests that a temporal limitation 
is set to the notion of respect, which, in essence, runs counter to that very notion of respect. 
“Orphaned  embryos”  can  exceptionally  be  greeted  by another  couple  (2  November  1999 
embryo donation Act = Décret du 2 novembre 2009), or else, they are destroyed.
 
At the opposite of the body’s history,  the corpse must also be respected as un element of 
humankind.
2.1.2 The corpse : the case of Maori warrior heads.
Since the 19th century, French cities have kept heads of New Zealand warriors in their 
museums. These heads are tattooed. They have an ethnographic and aesthetic value. Under 
French law, these heads are public properties: they cannot be sold. The act of 18 May 2010 
allowed a procedure to delist the heads of Maori warriors, in order to return them to New 
Zealand so that they be interred. The legislature, guided by respect for humanity, thus granted 
special treatment to human remains.
According  to  article  16-1-1,  inserted  into  the  French  Civil  Code  by  the  Act  of 
December, 19th 2008: "respect for the human body does not cease with death." The remains of 
deceased persons, including the cremate remains, should be treated with respect, dignity and 
decency.” French Courts (C.A. Paris, 30 April 2009, Cour de cassation, Civ. 1, 16 September 
2010) banned an exhibition that featured “plastinated” ecorché corpses, on the grounds that 
seeking commercial gains from exhibiting dead bodies clearly violated the respect owed to the 
deceased.   ("pursuant  to  article  16-1-1,  paragraph  2,  of  the  Civil  Code,  the  remains  of 
deceased  persons  should  be  treated  with respect,  dignity  and decency;"  ("exhibiting  dead 
bodies  for  commercial  purposes  ignores  this  requirement").  The  judge  may  prescribe  all 
measures to prevent or stop unlawful violation of the human body or of its parts, even after 
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death.  Indeed,  the  constitutional  principle  of  dignity  extends  beyond  the  strict  legal 
personality and is applied to the human person.
In order to protect the body of a young man in a brain death state, the Conseil d’Etat  
(Council  of  State)  (C.E.  Ass.  2  July 1993,  Milhaud)  intended  to  apply  ethical  principles 
regarding the respect for the human person which govern the relationship between doctors and 
patients ("considering that fundamental ethical principles relating to the respect for the human 
person, that apply to  the physician in his relationship with his patient, still apply after the 
death of the patient").
The  Conseil d’Etat,  made reference to the dignity of the dead in a case where the 
owner of a dog had buried it in the family vault (C.E., April 17, 1963,  Epoux Blois). The 
Conseil  d’Etat  acknowledged  the  legality  of  a  municipal  decree  ordering  the  dog  to  be 
withdrawn  from  the  municipal  cemetery  in  respect  for  the  dead.  In  a  ruling  dated  26 
November 2008 (Syndicat mixte de la vallée de l’Oise, Oise Valley local authority waste  
management services) the Conseil d’Etat allowed the setting up of a waste processing facility 
located on a World War One battle site, holding the remains of some three hundred soldiers. 
Acknowledging that the principle of dignity could operate in the regulations of environmental 
industries, yet, in this case, the judge weighed it up against the project needs and minimized 
the damage done to the human remains.
The Criminal Penal Code contains a section (articles 225-17 et seq.), included in the 
chapter about offences against the human person, entitled “violation of the respect for the 
dead”.  Any  violation  of  the  physical  integrity  of  a  corpse  committed  by  any  means  is 
punished by one year's imprisonment and a fine of € 15,000. The violation or desecration of 
tombs, burial grounds, funerary urns or monuments erected to the memory of the deceased, is 
punished by one year's imprisonment and a fine of € 15,000. The penalty is increased where 
the offences were accompanied by any discriminatory intent. The case law retains the actions 
accomplished before burial as possible infringements (stripping the body, taking pictures of 
it). Any tom deterioration, even uprooting flowers, falls within the ambit of the code, when 
there is intent to harm the respect for the dead. 
The judicial judge acknowledged image right so that the rest of the dead should not be 
disturbed. In the cases relating to the stolen photographs of the lifeless bodies of François 
Mitterrand (CA Paris 2 July 1997 and Cour de Cassation Crim. 20 October 1998) and Claude 
Erignac (Cour de cassation Civ. I, 20 Dec. 2000), the ruling was pronounced in the sense of a 
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remedy based on respect for the human person in the former case, and on respect for the 
dignity of the human person in the latter case.
2.2 Humanity as a limit to social exclusion.
Dignity  being  inalienable  to  all,  the  issues  that  are  thoroughly  discussed  in  legal 
doctrine and by political philosophy thinkers are whether dignity is the basis of all human 
rights or only one among other rights, whether it comes before liberty or reinforces it, whether 
it is a subjective right or an objective and transcendental principle. In fact, dignity seems to be 
all of the above at the same time. Its establishing is a real legal phenomenon and takes on any 
forms or any values, which enables a great variety in its judicial use.
Two famous cases judged by the  Conseil d’Etat  on 27 October 1995 (Commune de 
Morsang sur Orge) gave birth to a genuine paradigm of the judicial use of dignity linked to 
public order, which comes to limit the individual’s right to own and control his own body 
when it infringes on dignity (shared by all equally). The Conseil d’Etat acknowledges that 
mayors  could  ban  dwarf-tossing  on  account  of  public  order.  The  individual  is  legally 
compelled to be accountable for his human condition. He therefore becomes liable to it. Most 
commentators  clearly  highlighted  that  this  decision  imposed  a  limitation  on  individual 
liberties but also laid the emphasis on the “wrong” done to humanity.  Of course, the aspect 
that  was most commented upon in this  case was the intrinsic worthiness of dignity of its 
owner, in other words, the protection against oneself.  However, this aspect shows that the 
mechanism of human dignity can be distinguished from the dignity of the person.
The idea of “wrong against humanity” implies the legalization of morality, but that of 
dignity  would  even  go  further.  Patrick  Frydman  who  was  then  Commissaire  du 
gouvernement7,  stated “a bar attraction, aiming at encouraging the most basic instincts, and 
consisting  in  reducing  a  disabled  person to  the  level  of  object,  precisely because  of  this 
disability, can’t obviously find its place in a civilized society.” In that sense, it is much more 
than a moral wrong, an ethical misconduct that works against the interest of the civilization in 
the true sense of the word, against  the institution of the subject’s  civility.  The pernicious 
effect of this attitude which is, at first glance, praiseworthy,  is that the State intervenes to 
highlight disabilities and to stigmatize vulnerable persons who are deprived of the freedom of 
action acknowledged to others. 
7 A magistrate who have to comment and prepare the case before judgement in front of french administrative 
courts.
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The refusal of care also shows that dignity can limit the individual freedom to own and 
control one’s body. The administrative judge (CE, Ass 26 October 1001, Mme Senanayake et 
CE, 16 August 2002,  Mme  Feuillatey), basing himself implicitly on dignity, reckoned that 
doctors are not wrongdoers when they give a blood transfusion to a person who objects to it 
but  who  does  not  have  the  capacity  to  consent.  For  the  judge,  administering  a  medical 
treatment without the patient’s consent does not seem to run counter to the ban on degrading 
treatments, when the healthcare treatment is life-saving, or else it would mean that some lives 
do not deserve to be lived. 
To conclude, we can see that the notion of humanity shows a conflict between two 
dignities or two forms of dignity: the one of the person, and the one of humankind. 
The dignity of the human person seems to be different than human dignity. The dignity of the 
person is a concept that enables to defend a vulnerable person’s rights against abuse of power. 
A vulnerable person is easily exploited by another one. Vulnerability reduces the person to the 
level of object. That is why the law refers widely to “dignity” and “human person” in the case 
of vulnerable people or people victims of social exclusion. The law, focusing on the person, 
thus  establishes  for  example  palliative  care,  infrastructures  to  socialize  the  dying,  or 
incorporates the elderly dependants or patients in a chronic vegetative state (26 April 1999 
Act = décret du 26 avril 1999).
Criminal  law  uses  vulnerability  to  gauge  how  far  the  person’s  dignity  has  been 
infringed on, for example, when the owner of an insalubrious rental dwelling who was taking 
advantage of vulnerable people in precarious situation was condemned (TGI, Paris, 1997), 
when the odious behavior of the sexual attacker of an elderly woman was stigmatized (Cass. 
Crim. 29 January 1999), or when pimping was condemned as the exploitation of prostitutes. It 
is particularly the case with foreigners, especially illegal immigrants who are subject to forced 
labour and live in disgraceful housing conditions (Cass Crim. 6 May 1997). In the case of the 
persons  who were  deliberately  excluded  from the  group,  such as  prison inmates  and the 
mentally ill,  vulnerability has an objective base which can even be adjusted by society to 
protect itself. Article L. 332-3 of the Public Health Code lays emphasis on the protection  of 
the mentally-ill in-patients. This protection is justified on two grounds: individual liberties on 
the one hand and the dignity of the person on the other hand. 
Human dignity and the dignity of the person: the two faces of dignity, one referring to 
the human being, the other one to the human person, entail some material hierarchy where the 
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human being is not as well protected as the person. We talk about the respect for human 
beings and the dignity of the person. The second paragraph of the  Conseil Constitutionnel  
ruling on Bioethics distinguishes the respect for human being when his lives begin, according 
to the law on the termination of pregnancy.  The  second decision on abortion law (2001), 
explain that  the respect for human being is derived from the preservation of the dignity of the 
human  person,  the  only  constitutional  principle.  This  ruling  sets  down  that  when  the 
legislature allowed the termination of pregnancy, they put on the same footing the dignity of 
the person and the liberty of the woman whose distress situation was the prerequisite not to 
ignore the respect for the human being. 
Humanity gives great freedom of interpretation that judges may decline with dignity.
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